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Abstract: The adjudication of regional and international economic disputes has 
become the final frontier in the migration of constitutional ideas. The migration 
of these ideas across different branches of law has become increasingly com-
mon, building bridges between different legal systems, furthering judicial dia-
logue, and allowing judicial borrowing. Scholars, adjudicators and practition-
ers “establish a transnational legal discourse and act as merchants of law.” 
Against this background, this study investigates the migration of constitutional 
ideas to regional and international economic law by focusing on the migration 
of the concept of proportionality from constitutional law to European Union 
(EU) law and international investment law. The article shows that while the 
concept of proportionality has analytical merits, it also presents a number of pit-
falls when applied to the context of economic disputes. 
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Undoubtedly, philosophers are in the right when they tell us that 
nothing is great or little otherwise than by comparison. 
— Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels 
The adjudication of regional and international economic disputes has 
become the last frontier of the migration of constitutional ideas. The migra-
tion of constitutional ideas across different branches of law has come to be 
a common practice, building bridges between different legal systems, fur-
thering judicial dialogue and allowing judicial borrowing. Scholars, adjudi-
cators and practitioners “establish a transnational legal discourse and act as 
merchants of law.”1 According to this paradigm, constitutional ideas are 
“goods” or “merchandise” imported from the outside into a different legal 
order.2 Can constitutional benchmarks help adjudicators in interpreting and 
applying broad and open-ended treaty provisions? Can these constitutional 
ideas help facilitate the consideration of the commonweal in international 
and regional adjudication, contribute to the humanization of international 
and regional economic law, or both? Can the use of constitutional analogies 
contribute to the current debate over the legitimacy of international and re-
gional economic integration? Are there rules to govern this “market”? 
Should such rules exist? What are the limits, if any, of constitutional ap-
proaches to international and regional economic integration?  
Although the use of constitutional ideas in international and regional 
economic law can offer concrete solutions to emerging conceptual dilem-
mas, and is forcefully presented by reputed scholars, one may question 
whether a more critical approach to the use of such concepts should be 
adopted. It is often assumed that borrowing is a neutral process, but this is 
not always the case. Further reflection on the methodology of constitutional 
analogies in international and regional economic integration is needed. 
Against this background, this study investigates the migration of con-
stitutional ideas to regional and international economic law by focusing on 
a case study that is the migration of the concept of proportionality from 
constitutional law to European Union (EU) law and international invest-
ment law. The article shows that while the concept of proportionality has 
analytical merits, it also presents a number of pitfalls when applied to the 
context of economic disputes. While proportionality is a general principle 
of EU law,3 no consensus seems to have arisen with regard to its legal status 
in international law. If proportionality was a general principle of law, or 
 
 1  Sabino Cassese, Beyond Legal Comparison, 2012 ANNUARIO DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E DI STUDI 
LEGISLATIVI 387, 388 (2012). 
 2  Id. 
 3  See generally THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis ed., 
1999). 
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was deemed to reflect state practice (and thus constitute an element of cus-
tomary law) it could be eventually used in international investment law and 
arbitration as part of the applicable law or as a matter of treaty interpreta-
tion. Considering proportionality in investment treaty arbitration can be 
problematic due to this uncertainty. To be sure, if the applicable law is that 
of the host state and if such law includes the proportionality principle, then 
proportionality becomes relevant in the context of investment treaty arbitra-
tion. Beyond this specific case, however, this article focuses on proportion-
ality as seen through the lens of constitutional ideas and concludes that 
more comparative and international law studies are needed to ascertain the 
legal status of proportionality in international law. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, after a brief introduction, the no-
tion of the migration of constitutional ideas is defined and examined and its 
promises and pitfalls are investigated. Second, the study highlights some 
pitfalls of the proportionality analysis. Third, it focuses on the specific mi-
gration of the notion of proportionality from its constitutional matrix to the 
regional sphere, focusing on EU law as a case study of successful legal mi-
gration. Fourth, it examines the use of the proportionality analysis in in-
vestment treaty arbitration. Fifth, a critical assessment is provided—
focusing on some critical methodological questions concerning the migra-
tion of constitutional ideas and the identification of general principles of 
law. The conclusions will then sum up the key arguments of the study. 
 I. THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 
The migration of constitutional ideas is an interpretative and legisla-
tive act of borrowing elements belonging to given constitutional traditions 
and importing them into a different legal system.4 Constitutional law indi-
cates a body of national law setting up fundamental norms and mechanisms 
of power control for the protection of the rights of the citizenry.5 The basic 
idea is that the constitution constitutes “a higher or supreme law.”6 The gist 
of constitutional law is to subject the exercise of governmental powers to 
the limitations of a higher law.7  
 The migration of constitutional ideas is related to but differs from 
constitutionalism in that the former implies a distance and or invisible 
boundary between the source (i.e. the constitution) and the destination (in 
casu EU law and international investment law). Rather, constitutionalism is 
 
 4  On the “migration of constitutional ideas,” see generally THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
IDEAS (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006). 
 5  SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT ATHENS TO 
TODAY 4 (1999). 
 6  Günter Frankenberg, Comparative Constitutional Law, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW 171 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). 
 7  GORDON, supra note 5. 
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a conceptual movement or doctrinal project—some contend a phenome-
non—which proposes the constitutionalization of a number of different are-
as of law.8 Constitutionalization indicates: 
The attempt to subject all governmental action within a designated 
field to the structures, processes, principles and values of a ‘constitu-
tion’ . . . [s]ince governmental power is now being channelled 
through regional, supranational and international agencies, constitu-
tionalization . . . [aims at] subjecting the exercise of all types of pub-
lic power . . . to the discipline of constitutional procedures and 
norms.9 
The constitutionalization of different areas of law, ranging from public 
international law,10 to international investment law11 and EU law12—
scholars argue—promote their humanization, suggest the idea of a scale of 
higher values, and thus potentially contribute to the legitimacy of the sys-
tem.13 Yet, constitutionalism risks blurring the distinction between interna-
tional and constitutional law, thus interpreting the former through the lens 
of the latter, while it is a traditional tenet of international law that states 
must comply with international law even if this was in conflict with nation-
al law, including constitutional law. Whether or not the constitutionalization 
of these areas of law has taken place is subject to debate.14 For the limited 
purpose of this study, suffice it to say that constitutional law principles 
can—and has—influence(d) other areas of the law. This has taken place in-
to two different ways. First, the migration of constitutional ideas can take 
the form of a legal transplant when the lawmakers deliberately borrow giv-
en legal tools from other legal systems. Second, the migration of constitu-
tional ideas can take place at the judicial level through cross-judging. 
 
 8  NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRAS SAJÓ & SUSANNE BAER, COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2010). 
 9  Martin Loughlin, What is Constitutionalization?, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. & POL. 1 (2009). 
 10  See generally JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009) (examining the questions as to whether and if so to what extent the in-
ternational legal system has constitutional features comparable to what we find in national law); 
TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN MODELS (Nicholas Tsagou-
rias ed., 2007). 
 11  Peter Behrens, Towards the Constitutionalization of International Investment Protection, 45 
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS [ARCHIVE PUB. INT’L L.] 153–179 (2007). 
 12  See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION (T. Christiansen & C. Reh eds., 2009). 
 13  Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analy-
sis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004). 
 14  Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy Through ‘Higher Law’? Why Constitutionaliz-
ing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: 
EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 307 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003). 
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 A. The Migration of Constitutional Ideas through Legal Transplants 
The migration of constitutional ideas can take the form of a legal 
transplant from a legal system to another. The concept of legal transplant 
has been introduced by Alan Watson who contended that there is no inher-
ent relationship between law and society.15 According to Watson, being au-
tonomous from any social structure, law develops by transplanting.16 A le-
gal concept can be moved from a context and applied elsewhere.17 
Inevitably, the concept will adapt to the new context; however, according to 
Watson, the adaptation does not imply the failure of the transplant; rather it 
is a natural process.18 
In the constitutional realm, legal transplants have not been uncom-
mon—constitutional ideas have migrated from one constitutional system to 
another since ancient times.19 At the regional and international levels, the 
migration of constitutional ideas plays a central role in treaty-making.20 For 
instance, at the regional level, the treaty drafters structuring the relationship 
between the courts of the European Union and those of the Member States 
opted for a structure that echoes national systems delineating the interplay 
between their ordinary and constitutional courts.21 Constitutional law has 
played a pivotal role in the making of international (investment) law. For 
instance, the provisions against indirect expropriation in a number of inter-
national investment treaties derive from United States (U.S.) Constitutional 
law, specifically, the Penn Central test, articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.22 In parallel, as the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (US 
Model BIT)23 is often used as a template by a number of countries in their 
investment for treaty negotiations, the lex Americana has become the gold 
 
 15  A. Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 314–5 (1978). 
 16  Id.  
 17  Id. 
 18  A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 19–20 (2d ed. 1993).  
 19  Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve, Intent on Making Mischief: Seven Ways of Using Com-
parative Law, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 25 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 2012) (stating that 
Plato’s famous conception of the Republic “built on all the known constitutions of the time” and even 
Aristotle had a project of collecting texts on all constitutions). 
 20  George A Bermann, Comparative Law and International Organizations, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 241, 249 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012) (stating that 
treaty-making is one scenario “to which comparative law has the most obvious contribution to make 
. . .”). 
 21  Id. at 251. 
 22  Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). For commentary, 
see A.B. Sanders, Of All Things Made in America Why Are We Exporting the Penn Central Test?, 30 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 339 (2010). 
 23  The 2012 United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty includes both substantive and proce-
dural standards of investment protection. The United States uses this model when it negotiates a given 
BIT with another country. The text of the US Model BIT is available at the website of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State. 
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standard in the area.24  
This process has not been uncontroversial or uncontested. Some com-
mentators have argued that the extensive protection granted to investors’ 
rights amounts to an extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution,25 or an expression of the “Americanization” of inter-
national law.26 The interplay between constitutional law and international 
investment law in the form of legal transplant has been investigated by a 
number of authors;27 therefore this study focuses on the underexplored se-
cond dimension of this interplay—namely cross-judging. 
 B. The Migration of Constitutional Ideas through Cross-Judging 
At the adjudicative level, constitutional ideas have migrated across 
boundaries,28 contributing to the phenomenon of “judicial globalization”29 
and the cross-pollination of different legal cultures. International and re-
gional courts and tribunals as well as constitutional courts around the world 
have increasingly “cross-judged”—cited and or relied upon each other’s 
opinions—determining a judicial dialogue at both horizontal and vertical 
levels. 
At the horizontal level, the migration of constitutional ideas from one 
international tribunal to another allows these tribunals to de-fragment the 
alleged fragmentation of international law. The proliferation of different 
treaty regimes and international courts has raised the question as to whether 
international law is a fragmented system. There is no binding precedent in 
international law. As international courts and tribunals are not structured in 
a hierarchical fashion, they are not formally bound by the decisions of other 
peers. By “importing” concepts from other international courts and tribu-
nals, international adjudicators counteract the risk of fragmentation and re-
inforce the perceived unity of international law. In parallel, a number of na-
 
 24  José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 12–13 (I.A. Laird & Todd Weiler eds., 2010). 
 25  See, e.g., David Schneiderman, NAFTA’s Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to 
Canada, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 499 (1996). 
 26  On the Americanization of international law, see generally Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial 
Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383 (2003). 
 27  See generally SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION–
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION (2009); GUS VAN 
HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); Vicki Bean & Joel C. Beau-
vais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protection and the Misguided Quest for an 
International Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003); G. Starner, Taking a Constitu-
tional Look: NAFTA Chapter 11 as an Extension of Member States’ Constitutional Protection of Prop-
erty, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 405 (2002); M. R. Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation De-
bate through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 ENVTL. L. 851 (2003). 
 28  Sujit Choudry, Migration as the New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1–25 (Sujit Choudry ed., 2006). 
 29  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1103–24 (2000). 
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tional courts do consider foreign viewpoints in addressing analogous is-
sues.30 
In a vertical or hierarchical sense, national courts and tribunals in 
common law jurisdictions follow the rule of “stare decisis.” Analogously, in 
civil law jurisdictions, courts do regard the previous decisions of superior 
courts, although they are not formally bound by the latter. At the vertical 
level, the migration of constitutional ideas from constitutional law to the re-
gional and international sphere—through the coalescence of general princi-
ples of law or customary international law—allows a dialogue between na-
tional constitutional courts on the one hand and supranational courts and 
tribunals on the other. Such dialogue has also given rise to a common lexi-
con31 that fosters the circular migration of constitutional ideas from consti-
tutional courts to regional and international fora and then back to constitu-
tional courts.32 The migration of constitutional ideas to supranational law is 
not unbound; the duty to bring national law into conformity with regional 
and international law is a well settled part of customary law33 and this is 
confirmed by consistent jurisprudence.34 Reliance on national constitutional 
provisions does not justify a violation of supranational law. 
The migration of constitutional ideas reflects the current “zeitgeist” or 
spirit of the time due to the coexistence of different legal systems that are, 
at times, overlapping, diverging, or both—legal pluralism.35 Law—once the 
exclusive domain of states—has become a polycentric phenomenon, now 
the terrain of competition among multiple regulatory entities at national, re-
gional, and international levels. The adoption of communal judicial ap-
proaches is mainly motivated by functional reasons, especially when adju-
dicators face difficult cases, since resorting to other cases may provide them 
with useful examples and strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the out-
come.36 Looking outside one’s own system as a tool for reassessing and ad-
justing it to evolving circumstances can be a necessity.37 Whether this is 
done for imitation or because of convergence in a given policy domain, the 
 
 30  Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570 (2004). 
 31  See, e.g., David Feldman, Modalities of Internationalisation in Constitutional Law, 18 EUR. REV. 
PUB. L. 131 (2006). 
 32  Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law 
by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241 (2008). 
 33  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (7th ed. 2008). 
 34  See, e.g., Treatment of Polish National and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Dan-
zig Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 24–25 (Feb. 4). On the supremacy of 
EU law, see Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. 
 35  See, e.g., Günther Teubner, Global Bukovina: Legal Pluralism in the World-Society, in GLOBAL 
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Günther Teubner ed., 1997); Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking Constitutional 
Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 415 (2008). 
 36  Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 116 (2012). 
 37  Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007). 
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influence of borrowing goes beyond the specific case, influencing the cul-
ture of the importing system38 and determining gravitation towards certain 
models which exert dominant influence. Reverse constitutional borrow-
ing—absorbing the experience of other systems after their borrowing of 
constitutional concepts—is theoretically possible, albeit rare.39 For instance, 
in EU law reverse borrowing is taking place increasingly due to the influen-
tial role played by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).40 
 C. Methodological Aspects 
As the migration of constitutional ideas is in essence a comparative 
law endeavor, methodological concerns are myriad.41 Comparative law fac-
es deep methodological challenges,42 concerning, inter alia, “the proper 
terms, categories, scales, methods, and data to be used in comparison.”43 
More specifically, with regard to the migration of constitutional ideas, the 
key question is whether constitutional theory can be generalized and trans-
posed from the national terrain to the supranational sphere.44 If international 
adjudicators rely on domestic cases, there is a risk that they “cherry-pick” 
the cases they are more familiar with, namely those of their legal system. 
This possible selection bias increases the risks of importing, not necessarily 
the best qualitative models, but those that are more familiar to the adjudica-
tors.45 
The migration of constitutional ideas can (and has been) criticized on 
several grounds. First, by adopting “foreign elements,” adjudicators risk 
 
 38  See C. Picker, International Investment Law: Some Legal Cultural Insights, in REGIONALISM IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 27, 27–58 (L. Trakman & N. Ranieri eds., 2013). 
 39  See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 767 (2012) (mentioning the views of a few scholars that “the United States is losing 
constitutional influence” and that “the reluctance of the U.S. Supreme Court to pay decent respect to the 
opinions of mankind by participating in an ongoing global judicial dialogue is supposedly diminishing 
the global appeal and influence of American constitutional jurisprudence.”).  
 40  See infra Part I.C. 
 41  See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as 
a Critique of Global Governance 11 (Osgoode Hall Law Sch. Comp. Research in Law & Pol. Econ., 
Research Paper No. 1/2012, 2012) (“Just as comparative law in general, constitutional comparisons, too, 
are still plagued by a great degree of methodological uncertainty and theoretical indeterminacy.”). 
 42  Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 221, 224 (1999) (highlighting that “a collective crisis of methodological confidence is some-
thing of a defining genre of comparative legal scholarship, as each commentator outdoes the next with 
dire critiques of the field and timid solutions for reconfiguration.”). 
 43  Annelise Riles, The Projects of Comparison, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW 2 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001). 
 44  Günther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State, 
in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 328 (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010). 
 45  Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 125 (2005). 
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making or transforming the law rather than interpreting or applying it. Cus-
tomary norms of treaty interpretation, as restated by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), demand that adjudicators rely on the text of 
the applicable law. Second, sovereignty concerns—critics contend—also 
matter as courts should not impose “foreign moods, fads, or fashions” on 
their audiences, as this would infringe the separation of powers and under-
mine the very legitimacy of the adjudicators.46 Third, some scholars ques-
tion whether constitutional ideas can migrate successfully from a given 
constitutional experience to the international plane,47 contending that consti-
tutional ideas cannot be separated from the constitutional culture in which 
they are rooted.48 
The question of whether some legal systems are comparable lies at the 
very heart of any comparative endeavor. At the macro-level, the argument 
goes that EU law and international investment law are comparable to public 
law adjudication.49 Under EU law and investment law, states have agreed to 
give the CJEU and arbitrators respectively a comprehensive jurisdiction 
over what are essentially regulatory disputes.50 Authors postulate the exist-
ence of a regional and transnational “administrative space”: a space in 
which the firm separation between national, regional “and international has 
largely broken down, in which administrative functions are performed in 
often complex interplays between . . . institutions on different levels . . . .”51 
The CJEU has made consistent use of comparisons, referring to the 
constitutional experiences of the Member States to elaborate general princi-
ples of EU law.52 In parallel, investor-state arbitration has been conceptual-
ized as a global administrative law (GAL) creature,53 which impels states to 
 
 46  Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2495 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see generally Foster v. 
Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 470–71 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 47  Zumbansen, supra note 41, at 16 (wondering whether constitutional ideas can be “conceived in 
near to complete isolation of the historical-intellectual contexts in which the very concepts . . . ha[d] 
their origin” and pinpointing the need to “understand the potential of bringing the hidden histories of a 
particular legal field to light, as they feed into the conceptualization on a world scale.”). 
 48  Id. (suggesting that “close readings of national narratives of administrative governance reveal 
particular connotations of regulatory power and of the relationship between different institutions (legis-
lature, executive, judiciary and administrative agencies).”). 
 49  See generally MONTT, supra note 27; VAN HARTEN, supra note 27; DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PREMISE 
(2008). 
 50  Valentina Vadi & Lukasz Gruszczynski, Standards of Review in International Investment Law 
and Arbitration: Multilevel Governance and the Commonweal, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 613 (2013). 
 51  Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction, Global Governance and Global Administrative 
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006). 
 52  GIORGIO REPETTO, ARGOMENTI COMPARATIVI E DIRITTI FONDAMENTALI IN EUROPA: TEORIE 
DELL’INTERPRETAZIONE E GIURISPRUDENZA SOVRANAZIONALE [COMPARATIVE ARGUMENTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION AND JURISPRUDENCE 
SUPRANATIONAL] 192 (2011). 
 53  Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Ad-
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conform to global administrative law principles.54 Investment disputes arise 
from the exercise of public authority by the state, and arbitral tribunals are 
given the power to review and control such an exercise of public authori-
ty.55 Their awards ultimately shape the relationship between state, on the 
one hand, and private individuals on the other.56 Arbitrators determine mat-
ters such as the legality of governmental activity, the degree to which indi-
viduals should be protected from regulation, and the appropriate role of the 
state.57 
Nevertheless, other analogies are proposed at the macro-level,58 and 
international law scholars prefer to analogize EU adjudication and invest-
ment treaty arbitration to other forms of international dispute settlement. 
Some view the European Union legal order as “essentially one of interna-
tional law.”59 Arbitral tribunals review state action in the light of interna-
tional investment treaty provisions.60 Both systems are “about the way in 
which we bring the state under some measure of control, which is the main 
aspiration of general international law.”61 At the end of the day, both EU 
adjudication and investment arbitration are conducted on the basis of inter-
national treaties at a supranational level. Therefore, the CJEU and arbitral 
tribunals are analogous to other international courts and tribunals. 
Given the supranational law setting of EU adjudication and investment 
treaty arbitration respectively, it would be inappropriate to automatically 
transpose the experience of any national jurisdiction to such settings. For 
instance, “the Court of Justice has deliberately refrained from citing the rul-
ings of national courts in order to avoid allegations of cherry-picking or of 
the privileging of the rulings of one or more Member State courts over oth-
ers.”62 Analogously, in investment treaty arbitration, reference to the consti-
 
ministrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 121 (2006) (suggesting that “international investment arbitra-
tion—pursuant to regional and bilateral investment treaties—offers the clearest example of global ad-
ministrative law, strictly construed, yet to have emerged.”). 
 54  For a critical assessment of this theory, see Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest 
for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006). 
 55  See Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 53, at 121, 123. 
 56  VAN HARTEN, supra note 27, at 9. 
 57  Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on For-
eign Investment, 12 CAN. FOREIGN POL’Y J. 17 (2003). 
 58  Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty Sys-
tem, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 46 (2003). 
 59  Timothy Moorhead, European Union Law as International Law, 5 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 126, 
126–43 (2012). 
 60  Stephan W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 12 
GERMAN L.J. 1083, 1088 (2011). 
 61  James Crawford, International Protection of Foreign Direct Investment: Between Clinical Isola-
tion and Systematic Integration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: FROM CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION? 22 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. 
Tams eds., 2011) (referring to investment arbitration only). 
 62  Gráinne De Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Hu-
2VADI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/6/15 1:04 AM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:557 (2015) 
568 
tutional experience of a country different from the host state might seem out 
of place.63 Only insofar as a discrete number of constitutional experiences 
constitute evidence of state practice or general principles of law can they 
assume relevance in the context of supranational adjudication. 
Against this background, this article suggests that studies from differ-
ent domains of international, regional, and comparative law are needed for 
mapping the migration of constitutional concepts from constitutional law to 
regional and international economic law. This study focuses on a case, 
which exemplifies how, at the micro-level, constitutional ideas have mi-
grated to EU law and investment law, respectively. Proportionality analysis 
is an interesting case study because its migration from constitutional law to 
the supranational level is forcefully advocated by a number of scholars.64 
Yet, the methodological challenges and opportunities posed by the migra-
tion of proportionality to the supranational sphere have been under-
theorised. It is now time to address this problem. 
 II. PROPORTIONALITY: A COSMOPOLITAN DESTINY? 
A paradigmatic example of the migration of constitutional ideas is giv-
en by the mobility of proportionality across a wide range of national, re-
gional and international legal systems.65 As a legal concept, proportionality 
expresses the idea that there should be a balance between competing objec-
tives or values.66 In a number of constitutional traditions, the concept of 
proportionality is understood as a methodological framework for balancing 
conflicting values and aiming at delimiting the legitimate exercise of state 
authority.67 
Conceived as a tool for reviewing state conduct (and thus closely con-
nected with the aim of ensuring good governance), the proportionality test 
is usually articulated in three main phases—suitability, necessity and pro-
 
man Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 168, 178 (2013). 
 63  An important instance in which a given constitutional practice may be relevant is when the appli-
cable law is national law. In fact, some arbitral tribunals have referred to proportionality because propor-
tionality was embedded in the national law, which was applicable to the given dispute. See infra Part III. 
 64  See, e.g., B. Kingsbury & S. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State 
Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest: The Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 75 (S. Schill ed., 2010). 
 65  MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 2 
(2012) (noting that in the past decades proportionality has become “one of the most prominent instances 
of the successful migration of constitutional ideas . . .”). 
 66  The idea of justice as an archetype of proportion also appeared in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Eth-
ics. See Eric Engle, The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview, 10 
DARTMOUTH L.J. 1, 3 (2012). 
 67  Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic 
in Comparative (Constitutional) Law, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 555 (2008). 
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portionality.68 The suitability test requires that the adopted measure be ap-
propriate to achieve the stated aims. There must be a rational, logical and 
causal relationship between the measure and its objectives. The necessity 
test aims at verifying that the measure was the least restrictive available al-
ternative or that no less drastic means were available. The proportionality 
test in the narrow sense requires adjudicators to ascertain that the benefit 
obtained from realizing the objective exceeds the harm caused by the 
adopted measure. 
The main reason for proportionality’s success in the marketplace of 
ideas is its ability to restrain the exercise of public authority, shape judicial 
review, and manage private actors’ expectations. This section dissects this 
reason examining its various elements. 
 First, proportionality is based on “a culture of justification” which 
“requires that governments should provide substantive justification for all 
their actions . . . .”69 In order to be legitimate, a governmental action must 
be “justified in terms of its ‘cogency’ and its capacity for ‘persuasion,’ that 
is, in terms of its rationality and reasonableness,”70 as well as efficiency and 
optimization concerns.71 Proportionality is a “deliberative methodology,”72 
which requires that all of the relevant factors be considered and can insert 
“Socratic contestation” in the deliberative process of governmental action.73 
It then requires that a balance be struck according to the importance of the 
relevant interests depending on the contextual circumstances. 
Second, proportionality limits the subjectivity of the adjudicator, em-
powering courts and tribunals to review state conduct in a significant fash-
ion, and providing a structured, formalized and seemingly objective test. All 
awards and decisions must state the reasons on which they are based74; fail-
ure to state such reasons is a ground for annulment of the award.75 Propor-
tionality also allows adjudicators to adopt nuanced decisions rather than 
“all-or-nothing” approaches76 and to structure their analysis in a framework 
which “may produce better and more convincing reasoning, and enable 
 
 68  Jan H. Jans, Proportionality Revisited, 27 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 239, 240–41 
(2000).  
 69  Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 463, 467 (2011). 
 70  Id. at 475. 
 71  Id. at 467. 
 72  Iddo Porat, Some Critical Thoughts on Proportionality, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 243, 244 
(Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., 2009). 
 73  Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of 
Rights Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 141 (2010). 
 74  See generally Pierre Lalive, On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards, 1 J. INT’L 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 55, 55 (2010).  
 75  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 52(1). 
 76  Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 64, at 75, 79. 
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clearer assessment of tribunals, thus enhancing predictability.”77 In addition, 
proportionality can provide “a common language that transcends national 
borders and that allows for dialogue and exchange of information” between 
courts and tribunals.78 Proportionality analysis can constitute an entry for 
non-economic interests as expressed in general principles of law into the 
argumentative framework of adjudication and thereby help to overcome the 
fragmentation of international law.79 
 Finally, proportionality can also delimit—and thus indirectly define—
the legitimate expectations of private actors vis-à-vis regulatory or other 
types of governmental interference with their vested rights. Proportionality 
analysis can “reduc[e] the sense of defeat for the losing party. As such, it is 
consensus-oriented because it acknowledges explicitly that there are valid 
constitutional arguments on both sides and that the arguments outweighed 
by the opposing ones do not lose thereby their constitutional weight.”80  
Given the pervasiveness of the concept of proportionality in a few 
constitutional traditions81 and in various areas of international law, some 
authors contend that proportionality is an emerging general principle of in-
ternational law,82 or even an already established one.83 If one admits that 
such proposition is true, then such a contention would constitute a formida-
ble entry point for proportionality analysis in supranational adjudication, as 
adjudicators could refer to proportionality in their awards as either part of 
the applicable law, under Article 42 of the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID 
Convention),84 or as a rule of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT).85 If proportionality is a general principle of law, it 
can help the interpreter address the high level of indeterminacy of treaty 
provisions. Others contend that also good faith interpretation, as restated by 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT may require some balancing between the public 
 
 77  Id. at 103. 
 78  Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 72, at 472.  
 79  S. Schill, Cross-Regime Harmonization through Proportionality Analysis: The Case of Interna-
tional Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity and Human Rights, 27 ICSID REV. 87 (2012). 
 80  Wojciech Sadurski, Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics, in 
REASONABLENESS AND LAW 129, 145 (Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., 
2009).  
 81  See generally Alec Stone Sweet & Joseph Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Con-
stitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73 (2008).  
 82  ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 169 (2012).  
 83  See generally ENZO CANNIZZARO, IL PRINCIPIO DELLA PROPORZIONALITÁ NELL’ORDINAMENTO 
INTERNAZIONALE [THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] (2000). 
 84  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).  
 85  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).  
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and the private interest.86 
 III. PROPORTIONALITY: THE PERILS OF SUCCESS 
The migration of the concept of proportionality from constitutional 
law to the supranational sphere poses a range of challenges. In particular, its 
viability as the main tool for balancing different interests and values has 
been challenged on five grounds: (1) institutional competences; (2) scale of 
values; (3) cultural arguments; (4) incommensurability; and (5) overprotec-
tion of property rights. 
First, proportionality can be perceived as running against the tradition-
al allocation of institutional competences among the executive, the judiciary 
and the administrative organs. Democratic arguments run against using bal-
ancing to review the host state’s decisions, because adjudicators would se-
cond-guess the decisions of the host state by repeating the original decision 
making process.87 By considering different alternatives to given measures 
under the necessity test, and by balancing competing interests under the 
proportionality test the adjudicator interferes with the regulatory autonomy 
of states, supplanting the role of legitimately deputed decision-makers.88 
The rise of the proportionality analysis “as a juristic method, rather than a 
method restricted to legislation, threatens the sharp distinction between leg-
islation and legal interpretation . . . .”89 As Stone Sweet and Mathews put it, 
“balancing can never be dissociated from lawmaking: it requires judges to 
behave as legislators.”90 In particular, the necessity test would—almost 
without exception—invalidate the given measure since the adjudicator can 
always envisage alternatives ex post with the benefit of hindsight. 
Second, proportionality does not clarify the scale of values to be used 
in order to evaluate competing objectives. Even if the given measure passes 
the suitability and necessity tests, it may be considered to be disproportion-
ate under the third prong of the test when it is assessed in the light of com-
peting norms and objectives. In this context, “[t]he central question [i]s 
what must be proportionate to what.”91 Proportionality analysis tells us 
nothing about the scale of values that will determine the final outcome. The 
fact that proportionality concerns quantity rather than quality leaves the ad-
 
 86  Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equi-
table Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law 23 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, 
Pub. Law Research Paper, Working Paper No. 09-46, 2009). 
 87  Iddo Porat, Why All Attempts to Make Judicial Review Balancing Principled Fail?, Address be-
fore the VII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law 7 (June 11, 2007).  
 88  KULICK, supra note 82, at 172. 
 89  David Kennedy, Political Ideology and Comparative Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW 35, 36 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). 
 90  Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 81, at 88. 
 91  Jans, supra note 68, at 239. 
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judicator free to select his or her own value system, and the relevant criteria 
to explain why one value is considered more important than another.92  
Third, not only can proportionality analysis not take into account the 
cultural context of a given measure, but it also risks importing its specific 
cultural baggage into the adjudicative process. On the one hand, suprana-
tional adjudicators may not be familiar with the background of a given poli-
cy measure. As Burke White and von Staden point out, “prioritization of the 
values chosen by the polity requires both familiarity with those values and a 
degree of embeddedness within that polity.”93 However, supranational ad-
judicators are far removed from the polities over which they exercise con-
trol. 
On the other hand, proportionality comes from a certain historical set-
ting,94 reflecting distrust towards the public administration in the aftermath 
of WWII.95 In a number of European countries, including Germany, consti-
tutional law has gained an increasing primacy since the end of the war and 
the democratic transitions that followed.96 Constitutional courts have played 
a key role in making constitutional law effective,97 aiming to be an “impen-
etrable bulwark against any infringement of the rights of the people.”98 At 
the same time, lawyers elaborated the respective constitutions on the basis 
of “their understanding of state and society” with “distinct starting points 
and trajectories.”99 
Can proportionality be conceived in near to complete isolation from 
the cultural context in which it originated? Critical legal theorists contend 
that “hegemonic elites” might use proportionality to entrench their values 
and shift power from the democratic process to the courts100 and that pro-
portionality might have an “imperialistic effect,” in that it might set aside 
local constitutional values.101 In the EU law context, the concept of propor-
tionality has fostered the goal of European integration.102 With regard to in-
 
 92  Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 81, at 89. See also Kennedy, supra note 93, at 38 (stressing 
that there is a risk that proportionality analysis “operates in the shadow of ideology”). 
 93  William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The 
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 336 (2010). 
 94  COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 65, at 8. 
 95  M. Bobek, Reasonableness in Administrative Law: A Comparative Reflection on Functional 
Equivalence, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 311, 323 (Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara 
Valentini eds., 2009). 
 96  M. Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 257, 271 
(2008). 
 97  Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of “Constitutional 
Justice”, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).  
 98  Id. at 2 (quoting Piero Calamandrei).  
 99  Zumbansen, supra note 41, at 19.  
 100 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). 
 101 COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 65, at 8–9. 
 102 PAUL P. CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 532 (5th ed. 
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vestment law, scholars question whether the application of proportionality 
in investment arbitration could lead to the overprotection of property 
rights.103 
Fourth, some values can be incommensurable.104 While proportionality 
assumes measurability—to be balanced, two competing principles should 
be based on a common denominator105—arguments are made that cost-
benefit analysis is flawed with respect to public sector decisions due to the 
incommensurability of certain values.106 
Fifth, the use of proportionality analysis can lead to the overprotection 
of property rights if it is used in a very exacting fashion. In fact, the propor-
tionality analysis can restrict the regulatory power of the state to a large ex-
tent if arbitral tribunals do not adopt deferential standards of review.  
In conclusion, proportionality—like any conceptual framework—is 
not a neutral process; rather it is based on the primacy and priority of indi-
vidual entitlements over the exercise of public powers.107 The spread of the 
proportionality analysis highlights “a shift from a culture of authority to a 
culture of justification,” which is connected, inter alia, to the rise of the 
human rights movement that developed after WWII. Whether this entails a 
neglect of a polity’s choices towards a judicial dictatorship or the achieve-
ment of a higher rule of law—the ultimate rule of law108—is open to debate. 
 IV. PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
Proportionality is a general principle of European Union (EU) law and 
can be used for reviewing EU action and Member State action that falls 
within the sphere of EU law.109 The migration of the proportionality analy-
sis from constitutional law to EU law is a paradigm of successful legal 
transplant. Largely fashioned by the Union Courts, proportionality has sub-
sequently assumed treaty status110 since the inception of the Maastricht 
 
2011).  
 103 Han Xiuli, The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. Mexico, 6 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 635, 635–52 (2007).  
 104 Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). 
 105 AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 482–
84 (2012) (arguing that a common denominator exists in the form of the marginal social importance of 
each value). 
 106 FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING 
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004). 
 107 Maria Sakellaridou, La Généalogie de la proportionalité [The Genealogy of Proportionality], Ad-
dress before the VII World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law 20 (July 11, 
2007).  
 108 See generally D.M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW (2003). 
 109 CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 102 at 526; see generally THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY 
IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE, supra note 3; NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN 
EUROPEAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1996). 
 110 Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union art. 5, 2010, O.J. (C 83/01) (stating that 
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Treaty.111 The criteria for its application are set out in the Protocol No. 2 on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed 
to the Treaties.112  
The numerous reasons for the success of proportionality in EU law ad-
dress the criticisms moved to proportionality in a seemingly effective fash-
ion. Let us consider how the EU courts have transformed the various chal-
lenges posed by the proportionality concept in opportunities. First, with 
regard to institutional competences, the courts have interpreted the concept 
of proportionality in a flexible manner,113 conferring it a relative character 
and showing varying degrees of deference. In some cases, the CJEU has 
adopted “a very deferential approach,” in others it has conducted “quite a 
rigorous and searching examination of the justification for a measure which 
has been challenged.”114 In a seminal article, De Búrca noted: 
[I]n reaching decisions, the Court of Justice is influenced not only by 
what it considers to be the nature and the importance of the interest 
or right claimed by the applicant, and the nature and importance of 
the objective alleged to be served by the measure, but by the relative 
expertise, position, and overall competence of the Court as against 
the decision-making authority in assessing those factors.115 
Some authors contend that the Court has adopted a stricter proportion-
ality test when assessing national regulation (vertical dimension) and a 
more lenient approach when assessing Union regulation (horizontal dimen-
sion).116 Therefore, according to these authors, the court will adopt more 
demanding proportionality test in the former case, requiring the national 
legislation to choose “the less restrictive alternative.”117 In such cases, the 
Court tends to undertake a strict test of proportionality and only the less re-
strictive measures will be considered as proportionate.118 Instead, when re-
 
“the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties.”). 
 111 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on 
November 1, 1993. 
 112 Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union Protocol (No 2), 2010, O.J. (C 83/01) 
(on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon of De-
cember 13, 2007). 
 113 Tor Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 EUR. L.J. 158 
(2010). 
 114 Gráinne De Búrca, The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, in 13 
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 105, 111–12 (Thomas Bingham et al. eds., 1993). 
 115 Id.  
 116 See generally TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136–74, 193–241 (2d ed. 
2006).  
 117 Harbo, supra note 113, at 172. 
 118 See, e.g., Case 104/75, Van Justitie v. de Peijper, 1976 E.C.R. 613 (deeming a national measure 
conditioning the importation of medical products to the obtainment of certain documents to be dispro-
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viewing Union action, the court will deem the regulatory measure to be dis-
proportionate only if it finds it manifestly inappropriate to achieve the stat-
ed objective.119 
An alternative viewpoint suggests that the proportionality analysis has 
been interpreted differently according to the various areas it is applied 
to120—for instance showing a more deferential approach in the adjudication 
of public health related disputes, while at the same time detecting discrimi-
natory measures. This approach relies on the fact that the court has adopted 
a strict proportionality test even for Community measures for instance 
“where an individual argues that her rights have been unduly restricted by 
Union action.”121 There are a number of examples where such measures 
were deemed to be disproportionate.122 
Regardless of what causes the varying intensity of the proportionality 
test in EU adjudication, its is certainly not neutral. It is value-laden and ex-
presses the Court’s function of adjudicating disputes and “promoting Euro-
pean integration.”123 
Second, with regard to the scale of values, the case of the CJEU is ra-
ther unique, as the Court has recently acquired a mandate to adjudicate on 
human rights violations, since the Lisbon Treaty124 conferred binding nature 
to the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights.125 Not only has the European 
Union integrated the consideration of human rights in its treaty texts, but it 
is also negotiating its accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).126 Even before these notable institutional developments, 
 
portionate as a means to protect public health); Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolver-
waltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649 (deeming that the measure requiring a minimum alcohol con-
tent for a beverage was not necessary to protect consumers as less restrictive ways for protecting them 
could be envisaged, such as labeling). 
 119 Id. For instance, in Hauer, the Court found that the Community regulatory measure was propor-
tionate and thus not infringing the right to property. The claimant claimed that a Community regulation 
prohibiting the planting of new vines on certain lands for three years violated her rights to property and 
to pursue a trade. The claim was dismissed as the Court emphasized that the regulation pursued objec-
tives of general interest and did not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the 
property rights of the owner. The prohibition of the new planting of vines for a limited period of time 
was justified by the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community, namely the reduction of 
production surpluses and the restructuring of the European wine industry. Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land 
Rheinland-Phalz, 1979 E.C.R 3727. 
 120 Harbo, supra note 113, at 172. 
 121 CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 106, at 529. 
 122 See, e.g., Case 114/76, Bela-Muhle v. Grows Farm, 1977 E.C.R. 1211 (holding that a regulation 
requiring animal foodstuff producers to buy skimmed milk powder at a price three times more expensive 
than its current value was disproportionate). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
 125 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364/1). 
 126 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
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“the Court has made reference, for several decades since the early 1970s, to 
fundamental rights as general principles of law, and to provisions of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights as a source of inspiration underpin-
ning these general principles . . . .127 Therefore, favoring the objective of 
European integration does not necessarily entail a predominance of eco-
nomic interests vis-à-vis other non-economic values as the latter constitute 
part of the European project. This is particularly evident in a number of 
cases.128 
Third, with regard to the cultural arguments, while the Court has de-
rived the proportionality concept from “(some of) the Member States’ legal 
orders,”129 its application of the concept has at times converged130 and at 
times diverged from that of national courts.131 More interestingly, when re-
viewing state measures the CJEU has acknowledged the possibility of dif-
ferent approaches by Member States to similar issues,132 and has been “will-
ing to interpret proportionality in the light of the Member State’s particular 
values, notwithstanding that those values differ from those of other Member 
States.”133 In a few cases, the invocation of a norm as reflecting constitu-
tional history and identity has been accepted as a ground for relaxing the 
proportionality test.134 
Fourth with regard to incommensurability, the Court has found a 
common denominator in the various interests at stake in their social func-
tion. Finally, with regard to the eventual overprotection of property rights, 
relying on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
ECJ has pointed out that rights are not absolute and there may be cases in 
 
 127 De Búrca, supra note 62, at 170. 
 128 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 
2008 E.C.R. I-6351 (annulling the regulation that froze the funds of Mr. Kadi and finding that such 
measure infringed the right of effective judicial review, and the right to property. The regulation had 
given effect to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted against the Al-
Qaeda.); Case C-36/2002, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v. Oberbürgermeister-
in der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609 (upholding a German ban on the commercialization of 
violent games for protecting public policy and human dignity). 
 129 Harbo, supra note 113, at 172. 
 130 See, e.g., Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Phalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727 (holding that the rele-
vant Community regulation was proportionate to the stated objective). 
 131 See, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 (holding that the Community measure was proportionate to the stat-
ed objective). 
 132 Case C-108/96, Criminal Proceedings against Dennis Mac Quen et al., 2001 E.C.R. I-837, ¶ 34 
(stating that “the mere fact that a Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that 
adopted by another Member State cannot affect the appraisal of the need for and the proportionality of 
the provisions adopted.”). 
 133 CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 102, at 532. 
 134 Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, 2010 E.C.R. I-13693, ¶¶ 83, 
92.  
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which private interests may be limited for the commonweal.135 While this 
does not mean that all of the cases adjudicated by the CJEU have reached 
an optimal balance between the competing interests,136 at least there is an 
indication that this concern has been considered if not addressed by the 
CJEU.  
 In conclusion, proportionality has migrated successfully from the na-
tional legal systems of the EU Member States to the EU legal system. On 
the one hand, the EU courts have relied on the legal heritage of the Member 
states to establish proportionality as a general principle of EU law. On the 
other, they have interpreted the concept of proportionality in a flexible 
manner—so flexible as to transcend the classical understanding of propor-
tionality—shaping and adapting it to the various needs of European integra-
tion and the parallel protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Ultimately, the migration of proportionality from the national realm to 
the regional level may constitute a case of “overfitting legal transplant,”—a 
legal transplant which “work[s] even ‘better’ in the transplant than in the 
origin country,”137 fitting particularly well in the peculiar structure of the 
European Union. In fact, the accordion-like interpretation of proportionality 
as broad or narrow in a particular case allows the courts of the Union to ac-
commodate the converging divergences of the Member States, which pro-
motes European integration while respecting state sovereignty. 
 V. PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION 
Now the question is can proportionality be considered part of interna-
tional investment law and arbitration? Some authors contend that arbitral 
tribunals should adopt proportionality analysis,138 stating that “proportional-
ity analysis offers the best available doctrinal framework with which to 
meet the present challenges” to the investment treaty system.139 To the con-
 
 135 See, e.g., C-331/88, R. v. Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex parte Fedesa, 1990 
E.C.R. I-4023 (upholding a Community regulation prohibiting the use of hormones in meat production); 
Case C-210/03, Swedish Match AB & Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Sec’y of State for Health, 2004 E.C.R. 
I-11893, ¶¶ 56–58 (upholding the ban on tobacco for oral use deeming it to be proportionate the stated 
objective, namely the protection of public health, and acknowledging that other measures such as label-
ing could not achieve the same preventive effect). 
 136 See Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n & Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line 
ABP & OÜ Viking Line Eesti, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779. For commentary, see A.C.L. Davies, One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ, 37 INDUS. L.J. 126 (2008). 
 137 Mathias M. Siems, The Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplants, in THE METHOD AND 
CULTURE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARK VAN HOECKE 133–146, 134. (Maurice 
Adams & Dirk Heirbaut eds., 2014).  
 138 See Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW AND 
LEGAL ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 46 (2010). 
 139 Id. at 48. 
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trary, a few investment law scholars have pointed out that “there does not 
seem to be a strong legal basis for the application [of the proportionality 
analysis] in the cases where it has been applied” and that the conceptual 
foundations for using proportionality analysis in investment arbitration are 
shaky.140  
Most investment treaties do not refer to proportionality.141 As the Eu-
ropean experience shows, however, this does not necessarily mean that pro-
portionality is not part of the investment law system. In fact, this could be 
the case if arbitral tribunals used such concept. Against the background of a 
lively doctrinal debate on the migration of proportionality to investment 
treaty arbitration, an examination of the arbitral practice is of critical rele-
vance for ascertaining whether and, if so, how proportionality has migrated 
to investment treaty arbitration.  
While reference to proportionality used to be rare in investment arbi-
tration, in the past decade arbitral tribunals have increasingly relied on some 
form of proportionality analysis.142 This section explores how the concept 
has been used to define substantive standards of protection, including the 
protection against unlawful expropriation, fair and equitable treatment, and 
non-discrimination. It also discusses some cases which referred to propor-
tionality as required under the applicable national law and other cases in 
which proportionality was used to define the ambit of application of given 
exceptions. Finally, the section concludes discussing how proportionality 
has been used also with regard to procedural matters. 
With regard to the notion of expropriation, in Tecnicas Medioambien-
tales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, which concerned the re-
placement of an unlimited license by a license of limited duration for the 
operation of a landfill, the Arbitral Tribunal used the concept of proportion-
ality to ascertain whether given measures could be characterized as expro-
priatory. The Tribunal considered whether such actions or measures were 
“proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the 
protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the sig-
nificance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionali-
 
 140 BENEDIKT PIRKER, PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS AND MODELS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2013). 
 141 But see Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, 
U.S.-S.Kor., June 30, 2007, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (entered into force Mar. 15, 
2012); 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN NATIONS (entered into force Mar. 29, 2012). 
 142 This section does not purport to be exhaustive, as some arbitral tribunals may not be disclosed to 
the public, and other awards may have referred to proportionality only implicitly. This section acknowl-
edges only awards which have used the concept of proportionality expressis verbis. The argument is that 
the use of some elements of proportionality, like suitability, is a common judicial endeavor and therefore 
should not be reconnected to proportionality as such; while the implicit use of all of the various elements 
of proportionality without naming it would give rise to a number of distinct hermeneutical and legitima-
cy concerns. 
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In Azurix, which involved a water concession contract, Argentina had 
enacted measures for the protection of public health after an algae outbreak 
contaminated water supply after privatization.144 Warnings not to drink wa-
ter were enacted and customers were dissuaded from paying their water 
bills.145 In order to ascertain whether there was a (compensable) expropria-
tion or a (non-compensable) legitimate exercise of police powers, the Tri-
bunal relied on Tecmed, and its analysis of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)’s jurisprudence, stating that an expropriatory measure must 
pursue a “legitimate aim in the public interest” and the means employed 
must be (reasonably) proportional to the stated objective.146 The Tribunal 
dismissed the claim of expropriation.  
In Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, Ecuador contended that “[its] 
intervention in Blocks 7 and 21 did not constitute an expropriation of Bur-
lington’s investment”; rather, it “aimed at preventing significant harm to the 
Blocks’ and in Ecuador’s view it ‘was necessary, adequate, proportionate 
under the circumstances.’”147 The Arbitral Tribunal confirmed that Ecua-
dor’s intervention in the Blocks “was necessary to avoid significant eco-
nomic loss and the risk of permanent damage to the Blocks. It was also ap-
propriate because Ecuador entered the Blocks without using force. It was 
equally proportionate as the means employed were suited to the ends of 
protecting the Blocks.”148 
 With regard to the fair and equitable treatment standard, in MTD Eq-
uity SDN BHD and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, which concerned 
the failure of a construction project deemed to be inconsistent with zoning 
regulations, the Arbitral Tribunal held that fair and equitable treatment is “a 
broad and widely-accepted standard encompassing such fundamental stand-
ards as good faith, due process, nondiscrimination and proportionality.”149 
In Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, the Arbitral Tribunal stated 
that “numerous investment treaty tribunals have found that the principle of 
proportionality is part and parcel of the overarching duty to accord fair and 
equitable treatment to investors.”150 The claimant contended that a given 
 
 143 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/, ¶ 122 (May 29, 2003). 
 144 Azurix v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (June 23, 2006). 
 145 Id. ¶ 283. 
 146 Id. ¶ 311. 
 147 Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶ 164 
Dec. 14, 2012). 
 148 Id. ¶ 504. 
 149 MTD Equity SDN BHD & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Award, ¶ 109 (May 25, 2004). 
 150 Occidental Petroleum Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case ARB/06/11, 70 n.7 (Dec. 16, 2011). 
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sanction imposed by Ecuador was disproportionate and therefore violated 
legitimate expectations under the relevant BIT.151 The Tribunal concluded 
that the measure “was not a proportionate response by Ecuador in the par-
ticular circumstances of this case.”152 
Yet, in Glamis Gold v. United States of America, concerning a gold 
mining project in California, the claimant’s attempt to impose upon re-
spondent the burden of justifying the appropriateness of the regulatory 
measures and proving that they are “the least restrictive measures available” 
and “necessary, suitable and proportionate” failed.153 The Tribunal noted 
that “it is not for an international tribunal to delve into the details of and 
justifications of domestic law.”154 It also stated that “[i]t is not the role of 
this Tribunal, or any international tribunal, to supplant its own judgment of 
underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified domestic 
agency.155 To deem it otherwise—in the words of the claimant—would 
amount to transform arbitrators into ‘archeologists and ethnographers.’”156  
 With regard to non-discrimination, in Parkerings v. Lithuania, which 
concerned the planned construction of a parking area, the Tribunal stated 
that “to violate international law, discrimination must be unreasonable or 
lacking proportionality, for instance, it must be inapposite or excessive to 
achieve an otherwise legitimate objective of the State.”157 Yet, in Pope & 
Talbot, the Tribunal dismissed Canada’s argument that the foreign investor 
should prove that it was “disproportionately disadvantaged” by the meas-
ure.158 The Tribunal considered that the disproportionate advantage test 
would weaken NAFTA’s ability to protect foreign investors.159  
 Other cases referred to proportionality as if it were a requirement un-
der the applicable national law. In Aucoven v. Venezuela, relating to a 
highway concession, Venezuela argued that Aucoven’s claims did not meet 
the criteria of definiteness and proportionality required by Venezuelan 
law.160 In Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, the Tribunal considered that 
“[the] Respondent’s conduct did not infringe the principles of legal certain-
ty and proportionality in violation of the full protection and safety clause 
 
 151 Id. ¶ 277. 
 152 Id. ¶ 338. 
 153 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., IIC 380, Award, ¶ 590 (June 8, 2009). 
 154 Id. ¶ 762. 
 155 Id. ¶ 779. 
 156 Id. (stating that the Tribunal was mindful of Respondent’s statement that “[i]t is simply not this 
Tribunal’s task to become archaeologists and ethnographers . . .”). 
 157 Parkerings v. Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 368 (Sept. 11, 2007). 
 158 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal, Award on Merits of Phase 2, ¶¶ 
43–45 (Apr. 10, 2001). 
 159 Id. ¶ 79. 
 160 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. (‘Aucoven’) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Award, ¶ 338 (Sept. 23, 2003). 
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contained in Article 2(2) of the BIT.”161 The claimant argued: 
Instead of freezing only the cash equivalent to the claimed tax 
amount, Romania chose, through its fiscal authorities, to sequester 
all [Claimant’s] assets . . . and bank accounts . . . [t]his decision im-
paired Claimant’s right to dispose of its investment and was taken in 
breach of the principles of due process, proportionality and reasona-
bleness.162  
However, the Tribunal held that “[claimant] has not proved that this 
sequestration was discriminatory, disproportionate or otherwise improper 
under Romanian law.”163 In Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occi-
dental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, the 
claimant contended that “both international and Ecuadorian law proscribe 
the unilateral termination of a government contract where . . . the alleged 
breach was always known and never objected to by the State, and such ter-
mination was manifestly unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportion-
ate.”164 The claimant alleged that a given decree was “in breach of the Re-
spondent’s obligations under the Treaty and Ecuadorian law because it was 
unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate.”165 The Tribunal not-
ed that the proportionality review of the decree “pervaded the submissions 
of both parties” as “the Ecuadorian Constitution firmly establishes as a mat-
ter of Ecuadorian law the principle of proportionality.”166  
 In other cases, proportionality was used to define the ambit of applica-
tion of given exceptions. For instance, in Continental Casualty v. Argentine 
Republic, concerning an insurance business, the Tribunal imported the 
“weighting and balancing” formula from international trade law.167 Both 
parties had referred to the concept of proportionality. The claimant pointed 
out to Argentina’s Supreme Court decisions that declared a given decree “to 
be unconstitutional on the grounds that it was an unreasonable measure, 
lacking in proportionality between the deprivation of property rights and the 
objective of averting the crisis . . . .”168 The Tribunal considered the follow-
ing:  
[T]he Government’s efforts struck an appropriate balance between 
that aim and the responsibility of any government towards the coun-
 
 161 Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 358 (Dec. 7, 2011). 
 162 Id. ¶ 394. 
 163 Id. ¶ 515. 
 164 Occidental Petroleum Corp. & Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, ¶ 203 (Dec. 16, 2011). 
 165 Id. ¶ 206. 
 166 Id. at 70 n.7, ¶¶ 396–401 (on the principle of proportionality in Ecuadorian law). 
 167 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 192 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
 168 Id. ¶ 67. 
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try’s population: it is self-evident that not every sacrifice can proper-
ly be imposed on a country’s people in order to safeguard a certain 
policy that would ensure full respect towards international obliga-
tions in the financial sphere, before a breach of those obligations can 
be considered justified as being necessary under this BIT. The stand-
ard of reasonableness and proportionality do not require as much.169 
Finally, proportionality has also been used with regard to matters of 
procedure. In Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, which 
concerned the seizure of two electric utility companies, the Tribunal stated:  
[T]here needs to be some proportionality in the award (as opposed to 
the expenditure) of legal costs and expenses.170 A party with a deep 
pocket may have its own justification for heavy spending, but it can-
not expect to be reimbursed for all its expenditure as a matter of 
course simply because it is ultimately the prevailing party.171  
In Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic 
of Kazakhstan, which concerned license to explore and extract hydrocar-
bons, the Tribunal acknowledged:  
[O]n [the] one hand, ordering the production of documents can be 
helpful for a party to present its case and in the Tribunal’s task of es-
tablishing the facts of the case relevant for the issues to be decided, 
but, on the other hand, (1) the process of discovery and disclosure 
may be time consuming, excessively burdensome and even oppres-
sive and that unless carefully limited, the burden may be dispropor-
tionate to the value of the result, and (2) Parties may have a legiti-
mate interest of confidentiality.172 
These arbitrations took place in a variety of different locations, were 
conducted by different arbitral tribunals under different bilateral treaties, 
and concerned different subject matters and causes of action. One may le-
gitimately wonder whether there is any commonality between these awards. 
One may also question the relevance of discussing previous awards, given 
the fact that there is no binding precedent in international (investment) law. 
These awards show an increasingly frequent pattern in the use of some 
form of proportionality analysis in investment treaty arbitration. Propor-
tionality analysis is used in a varying of contexts—delimiting substantive 
standards of protecting, clarifying procedural matters and even quantifying 
 
 169 Id. ¶ 227. 
 170 Libananco Holdings Co. Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Award, ¶ 
565(c) (Sept. 2, 2011). 
 171 Id.  
 172 Liman Caspian Oil BV & NCL Dutch Inv. BV v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/14, Award, ¶ 26 (June 22, 2010). 
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damages and legal fees. The study of previous awards is useful because pat-
terns of consistent use can and do influence subsequent awards.  
Yet, the proportionality analysis is not used consistently in investment 
treaty arbitration. As mentioned, arbitral tribunals have used the proportion-
ality concept in different contexts. Proportionality is often mentioned in 
passing together with other concepts such as reasonableness and rationality. 
Most tribunals have not used it at all. More importantly, no single unified 
notion of proportionality has been used. Instead, arbitral tribunals seem to 
have elaborated ad hoc notions of proportionality depending on circum-
stances. In the context of investment arbitration, the proportionality analysis 
lacks the clearly articulated structure it has in other fields of national, re-
gional, and international law.173  
In conclusion, while generic reference to proportionality has increased 
in the awards rendered in the past decade, a critical mass of awards relying 
on this test is missing. In addition, at an analytical level, one may ask 
whether proportionality is inevitable; whether it is needed in investment ar-
bitration; or whether it can contribute to better awards given the specific 
features of international investment law. 
 V. A HISTORY OF SUCCESS? 
While the migration of constitutional ideas can flourish in certain con-
texts, it may easily falter in others. Why have EU adjudicators been drawn 
to proportionality when treaty tribunals have been half-hearted or even hos-
tile to the concept? The answer is multifold. 
First, EU law and investment law present very different institutional 
settings. EU law builds upon and fosters legal cohesiveness in the Union, 
constituting a sui generis system lying between a fully-fledged constitution-
al order and an international organization.174 Joseph Weiler argued, “one of 
the great perceived truisms, or myths, of the European Union legal order is 
its alleged rupture with, or mutation from, public international law and its 
transformation into a constitutional legal order.”175 Certainly, the Union is 
not a federal system, and the failure to ratify an explicit EU Constitution in 
2005 signals some reticence in that regard at least in some Member 
States.176 Yet, EU law has a “constitutional dimension.”177 Over time, the 
 
 173 N. Di Mascio & J. Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart 
or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 76 (2008) (noting that “The majority of the 
tribunals have . . . taken a considerably softer approach than the ‘necessity test’ under many GATT Arti-
cle XX exceptions, looking only for a ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational’ nexus between the measure and the poli-
cy pursued.”). 
 174 See generally M. Poiares Maduro, How Constitutional Can the EU Be? The Tension Between 
Intergovernamentalism and Constitutionalism in the EU (Jean Monnet, Working Paper No. 5/04, 2004).  
 175 JOSEPH H. H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 295 (1999). 
 176 See generally Giuseppe Martinico, From the Constitution for Europe to the Reform Treaty: A 
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EU treaties have been perceived as having assumed some constitutional fea-
tures.178 Although the Treaty of Rome was concluded in the form of an in-
ternational treaty, it has become the constitutional charter of the Union.179 
In fact, the European Court of Justice played a pivotal role in creating a ma-
terial constitution in its judgments,180 holding that the treaties founding the 
European communities (now the European Union) established a new legal 
order whose subjects do not only comprise Member States, but also their 
nationals.181 Commentators have pointed out that the court “constru[ed] the 
European Communities Treaties in a constitutional mode rather than em-
ploying the traditional international law methodology.”182 More fundamen-
tally, the integration project reflects some evidence of commonality in con-
stitutional principles or constitutional dialogue in Europe.183 
By contrast, international investment law is a relatively fragmented 
system where different arbitral tribunals interpret different treaties. Because 
of the lack of “stare decisis” in investment arbitration, it may be difficult to 
elaborate a meaningfully consistent proportionality test. Furthermore, EU 
law and investment law are at a different stage of development,184 and this 
makes their comparison necessarily approximate and perhaps premature. 
Second, despite some commonalities, EU law and international in-
vestment law have very different aims and objectives. Both systems pre-
suppose a triangular relationship between: (1) the individual—the EU citi-
zen and the investor respectively; (2) the state—the Member state or host 
state respectively—imposing certain burdens on that individual which may 
 
Literature Survey on European Constitutional Law, PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERALISM, May 12, 2009. 
 177 Wolf Sauter, Proportionality in EU Law: A Balancing Act? 4–5 (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., ILEC, 
Discussion Paper No. 2013-003, 2013) (referring to the existence of an “implicit constitution”). 
 178 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402/05 P & 415/05 P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & 
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351 (holding that “obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot 
have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty”). 
 179 Case 249/83, Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339 (stating that 
“[T]he European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither 
its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted 
by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty.”). 
 180 See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Ne-
derlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 
585; Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629.  
 181 Opinion 1/91 of the Court Pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty on the Draft Treaty on the 
Establishment of the European Union Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079. 
 182 Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1, 27 (1981). 
 183 Monica Claes & Maartje De Visser, Reflections on Comparative Method in European Constitu-
tional Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 143, 168–169 (Maurice Adams & Jacco 
Bomhoff eds., 2012) (noting that “by carrying out comparative constitutional research . . . there will be 
evidence of commonality in constitutional principles,” and suggesting that comparative law can contrib-
ute to “constitutional dialogue in Europe”). 
 184 While there are thousands of publicly available cases adjudicated by the CJEU, the available in-
vestment awards are much more limited. 
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preclude the exercise of her rights—under EU or investment law respective-
ly; and (3) the supranational court—the CJEU or the relevant arbitral tribu-
nal respectively.185 Despite this common tripartite framework, there are 
very different fundamental assumptions underlying the two systems. On the 
one hand, the once European Economic Community (EEC) “‘market citi-
zen’—Marktbürger—engaged in using the market freedoms under the EEC 
Treaty”186 has become a European Union citizen entitled to a number of 
rights, not only of an economic nature. Therefore, the balancing process 
takes place in a system where economic interests are part of a broader pic-
ture. By contrast, international investment law has the objective of fostering 
foreign direct investment and of promoting economic development.187 Arbi-
tral tribunals do not have the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CJEU; ra-
ther they have a more limited mandate. 
Third, the CJEU has abstracted the proportionality principles from the 
legal systems of its Member States; unless the proportionality principles 
was also a principle of international law, or was part of the applicable law 
as included in the domestic law of the host state it appears that its applica-
tion might seem shaky. In this regard it is remarkable that arbitral tribunals 
have used proportionality in conjunction with other criteria such as reason-
ableness and rationality. 
On the other hand, further reflection on methodological issues is of 
key importance. Methodological concerns have long been a common fea-
ture of comparative constitutional law.188 Although there is no single meth-
odological model in comparative law, two fundamental approaches to the 
field have emerged—the functional approach and the cultural approach.189 
The functional approach relies on the assumption that law addresses social 
problems and that all societies confront essentially the same challenges.190 
The functional approach thus presupposes similarity among legal systems 
 
 185 For analogous reasoning with regard to EU law, see Norbert Reich, How Proportionate is the 
Proportionality Principle? Some Critical Remarks on the Use and Methodology of the Proportionality 
Principle in the Internal Market Case Law of the ECJ, Working Paper presented at the Oslo conference 
on The Reach of Free Movement (May 18, 2011). 
 186 Id. at 11. 
 187 See, e.g., J. Bhagwati, Why Multinationals Help Reduce Poverty, 30 WORLD ECON. 211 (2007); 
V.N. Balasubramanyam, M. Salisu & D. Sapsford, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: New Hy-
potheses and Evidence, 8 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV. 27 (1999). 
 188 See Günther Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—Toward a 
Layered Narrative, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 439 (2006); Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in 
Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 67 (Sujit Choudry ed., 
2006); Peer Zumbansen, Comparative Law’s Coming of Age?, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1073 (2005).  
 189 See generally Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339–382 (Matthias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) 
(explaining the functional approach); Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232 
(1996) (explaining the cultural approach). 
 190 See, e.g., Konrad Zweigert, Méthodologie du droit compare [Methodology of Comparative Law], 
in MÉLANGES J. MAURY 579, 570–596 (Dalloz-Sirey ed., 1960). 
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(praesumptio similitudinis),191 potentially reflecting “epistemological opti-
mism,”or the belief that legal systems are comparable.192 For instance, Alan 
Watson contended that there is no inherent relationship between law and 
society—being autonomous from any social structure, law develops by 
transplanting.193 Inevitably, the concept will adapt to the new context; how-
ever, according to Watson, the adaptation does not imply the failure of the 
transplant; rather it is a natural process.194 
 Cultural approaches reject a purely functionalist vision of law and 
contend that law expresses and develops the cultural features of a society. 
Therefore, not only do comparativists need to consider the functions of le-
gal concepts, but they also have to contextualise such concepts in their legal 
matrix and culture of origin.195 Meaningful comparisons require understand-
ing the cultural context of legal rules.196 For instance, Otto Kahn-Freund be-
lieved that law cannot be separated from its thelos and context.197 Accord-
ing to Kahn-Freund, not only should one verify whether the item that would 
be borrowed has proven satisfactory in its system of origin, but she also 
should consider whether it would be suitable to the potentially recipient sys-
tem.198 As Pierre Legrand has stated, each legal system is unique, reflecting 
a particular worldview.199 Law can be considered as a “cultural expres-
sion.”200 
 Despite their differences, comparative law methodologies share a 
number of caveats as a common denominator. For instance, superficial bor-
rowing, based on inadequately verified information should be avoided (e.g., 
when adjudicators rely on sources provided by the parties without further 
research). Analogously, the selection of the use of certain countries as ex-
amples should be justified. If comparisons are made, these should be explic-
it rather than implicit. The understanding of the borrowed items should be 
proper, accurate and contextual. More fundamentally, one should consider 
whether the migration of constitutional ideas to transnational systems serves 
outcomes in compliance with the culture of such systems. 
 Finally, judicial borrowing cannot be a mechanical process also in 
 
 191 Jaakko Husa, Methodology of Comparative Law Today, 4 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT 
COMPARÉ [R.I.D.C.] 1095, 1107 (2006). 
 192 Mark Van Hoecke, Deep Level Comparative Law, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 172, 172–174 (2004). 
 193 See Watson, supra note 15, at 314–315; see generally WATSON, supra note 18.  
 194 WATSON, supra note 18. 
 195 John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 626 (1998). 
 196 Legrand, supra note 189.  
 197 Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
 198 Id. at 6 (questioning: “Are there any principles which may assist us in measuring the degree to 
which a foreign institution can be ‘naturalized’?”). 
 199 See Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 517 (2006). 
 200 See generally Reza Banakar, Power, Culture and Method in Comparative Law, 5 INT’L J. L. 
CONTEXT 69, 78 (2009) (stressing the dialectical nature of the relationship between law and society). 
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consideration of the fact that until recently both comparative law and inter-
national law used to have a Westphalian201—if not Eurocentric—
character.202 For a long time, comparative law (has) focused on European 
legal systems; the law of former colonies—with the exception of US law—
was largely overlooked. In other words, by limiting its focus to Western le-
gal traditions, comparative law contributed to the legitimization of an order 
in which peripheral countries were rarely recognized for any creative con-
tribution to the market of legal ideas.203 Comparative law scholars have as-
sumed that law is almost completely of European-making, which unfolded 
through nearly the entire world via colonialism, imperialism, trade, and 
more recently, through neo-liberal structural adjustment programs in devel-
oping countries, post-conflict reconstruction, and reform in countries in 
transition. 
 In parallel, the making of international law used to have a predomi-
nantly Western character.204 Some authors have even questioned whether 
and how international is international law,205 highlighting “the idea of inter-
national law as an ordering mechanism that draws its categories from an es-
sential culture and yet stands apart from its cultural context.”206 The origins 
of international law are imbued of civil law ideas; the fathers of internation-
al law—such as Grotius, Gentili, and others—borrowed concepts from their 
traditions that regarded Roman law as the standard by which justice should 
be measured.207 Furthermore, international law mainly governed relations 
among states, despite some treaties, which also regulated the interaction be-
tween states and indigenous peoples.208 
In the post-colonial era, however, there is an emergent awareness that 
 
 201 See generally Treaty of Westphalia: Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Empire and the King 
of France and their respective Allies (1648), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_ 
century/westphal.asp. 
 202 See generally William Twining, Globalization and Comparative Law, 6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMP. L. 217, 233 (1999). 
 203 Jorge González Jácome, El uso del derecho comparado como forma de escape de la subordi-
nación colonial [The Use of Comparative Law as a Way to Escape from Colonial Subordination], 7 
INT’L L.: REV. COLOMB. DERECHO INT’L 295, 301 (2006): (affirming that “se está contribuyendo a la 
legitimación de un orden geopolítico en donde a los países periféricos se les atribuye poca posibilidad 
creativa en el mercado de las ideas jurídicas [it is contributing to the legitimacy of a geopolitical order in 
which the peripheral countries are credited with little creative potential in the market for legal ideas].”). 
 204 See generally ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
 205 Kurt T. Gaubatz & Matthew MacArthur, How International is International Law?, 22 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 239 (2001). 
 206 Annelise Riles, Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentializa-
tion of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723, 738 (1993). 
 207 See generally THE ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (Benedict Kingsbury & Ben-
jamin Straumann eds., 2010). 
 208 A notable example is the Treaty of Waitangi, signed on February 6, 1840, by representatives of 
the British Crown and various Māori chiefs from New Zealand. 
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diffusion of law does not necessarily lead to convergence, harmonization, 
or unification of laws. On the one hand, scholars have pointed out the mul-
ticultural genealogy of the Western legal tradition.209 On the other hand, the 
imported law did not remain the same: “legal transplants undergo meaning 
transformation once they are implanted into a new legal system” and are 
“transformed by the new context.”210 Furthermore, in a number of coun-
tries—the so-called mixed jurisdictions—the Romano-Germanic tradition 
and the common law have met and mingled for historical reasons with var-
iegated outcomes.211 More recently, economic globalization has spurred the 
constant contact and communication among legal cultures facilitating pro-
cesses of mutual borrowing, cross-fertilization, and learning.212 Therefore 
many characteristics that define and shape legal families “are fading or 
spreading into other systems.”213 
In conclusion, the migration of proportionality from constitutional law 
to EU law has been a relatively straightforward process due to the fact that 
such principles already belonged to the legal heritage of a few Member 
States. The legal transplant was subject to some adaptation. In fact, the Eu-
ropean courts have fashioned the proportionality to meet their own needs. 
Authors have noted these unintended consequences of the “naturalization” 
process—some have criticized the more lenient understanding of propor-
tionality, highlighting that the CJEU interprets proportionality in some are-
as in a way that is closer to the reasonableness test than the classical under-
standing of the proportionality analysis.214 Others have suggested that 
proportionality—like other general principles of law—may have become an 
enfant terrible of the Court due to its unpredictability.215 On the other hand, 
the migration has been successful exactly because the European Courts 
have adapted the concept to the needs of European integration and the pro-
tection of human rights. More fundamentally, they have relied on the com-
mon European legal heritage. One may wonder whether the same pre-
conditions for success also exist in investment arbitration. Arbitrators 
should be aware of the methodological risks and opportunities offered by 
 
 209 See Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Black Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the “Western 
Legal Tradition”, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 484 (2000) (highlighting that Roman law is a multicultural 
product due to the interaction of different civilizations). 
 210 Banakar, supra note 200, at 82. 
 211 See Nicholas Kasirer, Legal Education as Métissage, 78 TUL. L. REV. 481, 481 (2003). 
 212 Jaye Ellis, General Principles and Comparative Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 949, 966 (2011). 
 213 Colin B. Picker, International Law’s Mixed Heritage, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1083, 1094 
(2008); but see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uni-
formity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 63 (2001) (stressing 
the enduring difference between civil law and common law systems). 
 214 Harbo, supra note 113, at 185. 
 215 T. T. TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 4 (1998) (stating that general principles 
of EU law were “children of national law, but as brought in front of the Court, they became enfants ter-
ribles.”). 
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comparative law: more fundamentally, they should be aware of their man-
date to adjudicate the relevant disputes “in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law.”216 
 CONCLUSIONS 
The migration of legal concepts has become an increasingly common 
phenomenon, highlighting a cosmopolitan if not “nomadic” character of 
law.217 Conceived as an analytical tool to assist adjudicators in determining 
the interaction between public and private interests, the concept of propor-
tionality has attracted increasing attention by scholars and policymakers and 
has migrated from constitutional law to a number of other fields of national, 
regional and international law. Proportionality can be used to delimit the 
exercise of the police powers of the public authorities, ascertaining the con-
sistency between a certain measure and its objectives. 
 This study investigated the question as to whether and if so, to what 
extent, proportionality has migrated from constitutional law to EU law and 
international investment law respectively. Undoubtedly, the migration of 
proportionality to EU law is a paradigmatic case of successful legal trans-
plant. The migration of proportionality to international investment law and 
arbitration remains a work in progress. Eminent authors forcefully suggest a 
broader use of proportionality in international investment law and arbitra-
tion. Others consider proportionality analysis inappropriate for arbitral tri-
bunals. Rather they consider that a degree of deference should be paid to the 
sovereign choices of the host state. Against this background, this article has 
examined the relevant jurisprudence and proposed an alternative viewpoint, 
namely that of the interplay between comparative law and international 
law—highlighting the pros and cons, and the methodological issues raised 
by the migration of constitutional ideas in general (and proportionality in 
particular) from one field to another. If arbitral tribunals are to use propor-
tionality to form their interpretation of particular provisions, they must en-
sure that they master the relevant methodological risks and opportunities. 
 This article is intended as a contribution to the debate in the field of 
international and regional economic integration—identifying and critically 
assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the migration of proportion-
ality from constitutional law to supranational law. The adoption of propor-
tionality is not a neutral process as it may have important consequences. 
Certainly, more comparative constitutional law studies are needed to ad-
dress the question as to whether proportionality is a general principle of in-
ternational law. 
 
 216 Vienna Convention, supra note 85. 
 217 WATSON, supra note 18, at 108. 
